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The Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative in the
Department of Defense (DoD) is an attempt to eliminate duplicate
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems through the standardization
of functional area requirements across all DoD agencies. CIM
imitative management recognized that the DoD organizational culture
might impact or be impacted by such an all-encompassing initiative.
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the possible impact of
culture on Information systems implementations by conducting a
literature review of cultural theory, change theory, resistance to
change, and information systems implementation. The thesis
concludes with a recommendation for implementation of the CIM








II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 4
A. WHAT CULTURE IS 4
1. Definition of Culture 4
2. Levels of Culture 5





5. Culture as a Group Phenomenon 10
B. THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR CULTURE 11
C. HOW TO STUDY A CULTURE 13
1. Schein's Methodology 15
a. Step 1. Entry and Focus on Surprises . 16
b. Step 2. Systematic Observation and
Checking 16
c. Step 3. Locating a Motivated Insider . 16
d. Step 4. Revealing Surprises and Hunches 16
e. Step 5. Joint Exploration to Find
Explanation 17
f. Step 6. Formalizing Hypotheses .... 19
XV
g. Step 7, Systematic Checking and
Consolidation 19
h. Step 8. Pushing to the Level of
Assumptions 19
i. Step 9. Perpetual Recalibration .... 20
j. Step 10. Formal Written Description . . 20
2. Sathe's Methodology 20
3. Wilkins' Methodology 22
4. Schwartz and Davis' Methodology 23
5. Army Corps of Engineers Framework 2 6
D. USING A CULTURAL ASSESSMENT 2 6
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 28
A. DEFINING LEWIN' S MODEL OF CHANGE 28
B. INNOVATION 32
C. TICHY'S THREE ORGANIZATIONAL CYCLES 34
D. REASONS FOR RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 3 9
E. TACTICS TO DEAL WITH RESISTANCE TO CHANGE ... 42
1. Kotter's Tactics 42
2. Using a Change Agent 45
IV. CHANGE STRATEGIES 47
A. APPROPRIATE CHANGE STRATEGY 4 7
1. Instrumental View 4 8
a. Creation of a Vision 49
b. Communication of the Vision 4 9
V
c. Socialization of New Members 50
d. Role Modeling by Leaders 51
e. Use of Reward System 51
f. Symbolic Management 52
g. Rites and Rituals 52
2. Navigational View 53
V. RELATING CHANGE AND RESISTANCE TO SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION 58
A. THE CHANGE APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION 59
B. CONDITIONS FAVORING THE CHANGE APPROACH TO
IMPLEMENTATION 60
C. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 62
1
.
Involvement by Employee Level and Development
Phase 62
2 Communication 66
3. Other Studies of User Involvement 67
a. Robey and Farrow (1982) 67
b. Baroudi, Olson, and Ives (1986) .... 68
c. Baronas and Louis (1988) 68
d. Ginzberg (1981) 70
D. RESISTANCE TO SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 71
1. Employee Education 72




A. SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO CIM 79
B. IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH 81
1. Phase One 81
2. Phase Two 8 3
3. Phase Three 85









The Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative
within the Department of Defense (DoD) was created to
correct deficiencies in Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
,
such as system redundancies across services and agencies,
ADP management ineffectiveness, and dissimilar data
architectures across similar functional areas within various
agencies. These deficiencies were emphasized by criticisms
from the Congress, the Government Accounting Office (GAG)
,
and the "Defense Management Review to the President"
(submitted by the Secretary of Defense in July, 1989) . For
further information on the creation of CIM in the DoD, see
Appendix A.
CIM in DoD has three main objectives:
1. ensure standardization, quality, and consistency of
data within DoD's various information systems,
2. implement standard management policies that support
the information system life cycle, and
3. eliminate duplication of effort in the development
of similar information systems that provide similar
functional capabilities across different DoD
agencies (Leong-Hong, 1990)
.
It is expected that these CIM objectives will eventually
encompass all administrative functions and tactical systems
short of airborne weapons systems within DoD.
Accomplishing CIM' s three main objectives necessitates
changing the policies regulating the purchase and
development of information systems, as well as information
management policies throughout the different agencies within
the DoD. CIM management recognized that changes of this
magnitude could meet with resistance from DoD and service
agencies. Consequently, a study of the cultural impact (and
the possible attendant resistance) to the CIM initiative was
requested. This paper is an answer to that request.
Initial research into the topics of culture and the
effects of information system implementations on an
organization, led to a realization that the answer to CIM
management's problem involved more than just culture. As an
innovative change within DoD, the impact of CIM led to
further research in the areas of innovative change theories
and implementation of strategic change strategies. This was
required because no other change initiative of such
magnitude had been attempted across all DoD agencies.
Therefore, this paper reflects the larger body of literature
by addressing the requested issues of culture and
resistance, as well as the topics of change theory, general
considerations for reducing resistance, and increasing the
acceptability of strategic change and information system
implementation
,
Chapter II explores the phenomenon of organizational
culture: its levels, formation, and member indoctrination.
Methodologies for assessing cultures are then presented.
Chapter III deals with definitions; change (according to
Lewin) , innovation, and the organizational change cycles
defined by Tichy are presented. Resistance to change and
tactics for dealing with resistance to change are also
addressed. Chapter IV examines how to determine an
appropriate change strategy based on the use of either the
instrumental view of change or the navigational view of
change. Chapter V explains a change approach to information
system implementation and explores various issues related to
system implementations. Chapter VI contains recommendations
for CIM management actions based on the literature review.
II . ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
This chapter explores the phenomenon of organizational
culture. First, organizational culture is defined and
observed at various levels (visible, conscious,
unconscious) . Next, the way in which a culture forms and
the manner in which new members are indoctrinated into the
group is explained. Once culture itself has been discussed,
a case is made for the necessity of studying an
organization's culture if changes to the organization are to
be made. Finally, four methodologies for studying culture
and performing a cultural assessment are presented.
A. WHAT CULTURE IS
1 . De£init.ion of Culture
A comprehensive definition of organizational culture
offered by the organizational psychology school is given by
Schein (1983) as "a pattern of basic assumptions - invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to
cope with its problems of external and internal
integration - that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems." Others (Louis, 1981; Deal and Kennedy,
1982; Sathe, 1983; Wilkins, 1983), in the process of
developing perspectives on organizational culture, have
defined organizational culture by emphasizing various
aspects of Schein' s definition. These definitions do not
contradict the basic tenets of the organizational psychology
school, but are less comprehensive than Schein' s or tend to
focus on issues which are the results of an organization's
culture instead of dealing with what culture really is.
2 . Levels of Culture
Schein contends that culture can be analyzed on
several levels. The first level is visible artifacts
evident in the physical environment of a culture; building
architecture, manner of dress, public documents, readily
discernable behavior patterns, etc. (Schein, 1985)
.
Examples might include: no reserved parking, shirt sleeves
and no ties, large work areas with few partitioned offices.
An entire school of cultural thought has grown around this
first level of culture. Called the anthropological school
this simple view of organizational culture accepts only
those thing? that are concrete and observcible in an
organization as pertaining to its culture (Sathe, 1983)
.
The level of visible artifacts may be easy to discern, but
gives no concrete indications as to why a group behaves as
it does (Schein, 1985) . The second level of an
organization's culture is the values that govern behavior.
These values are hard to observe and normally must be
inferred by conducting interviews with key organizational
members (Schein, 1985) . However interviews normally reveal
only espoused values (what members say their reasons for
behavior are and what they would ideally like their reasons
for behavior to be) . Examples of espoused values might be:
senior personnel are to be respected, watch out for your
teammate, or protect the environment. Because these
espoused values may only be ideals, the third level of
organizational culture, basic assumptions, must be probed in
order to discover why an organization behaves the way it
does (Schein, 1985) . Basic assumptions are old espoused
values that were found to be valid over a long period,
became taken for granted, and dropped out of awareness
(Schein, 1985) . As such, they are less open to debate
regarding validity and are so powerful that any attempt to
c[uestion them appears to a group member as an exhibition of
ignorance (Schein, 1985) . Excimples of basic assumptions may
be: the individual is a source of good ideas, truth is
discovered through debate, watch for your teeunmate (Schein,
1990) .
Sets of interrelated basic assumptions about the
nature of the environment, mankind, and activities
eventually become patterned into cultural paradigms (Schein,
1984)
.
These patterns of assumptions meet the human need
for order and consistency which means that any given
paradigm will evolve so as not to contain inconsistent sets
of assumptions (Schein, 1990). The contents of the group's
cultural paradigms are the foundations upon which that
group's values are grounded (Schein, 1990) . These values
are then manifested in behaviors, behaviors which may appear
irrational to the outside observer until the basic
assumptions of the culture are understood.
3 . Development and Modification of Basic Assumptions
The learning of solutions to problems which the
group encounters is the basic process that transforms values
into basic, hidden assumptions. Ordinarily, learning
remains consistent with previously established cultural
paradigms (Schein, 1984) . There are two mechanisms for
learning; either positive problem solving (in which the
group tries alternate solutions until something works and
keeps using the solution until it fails) or anxiety
avoidance (in which the group finds a successful avoidance
behavior and uses it indefinitely due to a reluctance to try
new behaviors thereby risking anxiety) ; the more powerful
and lasting of the two is anxiety avoidance (Schein, 1984)
.
Group founders hold a key positions in the
establishment of cultural paradigms. Founders define or
originate group's initial sets of basic assumptions.
Founders continue to hold a central position as the culture
of the organization matures by defining solutions to new
situations. Once a founder leaves an organization, the new
leader that replaces the founder assumes a prominent role in
defining solutions to problems but is still subject to the
basic assumptions initially set in place by the founder
(Schein, 1985)
.
Romans (1950) distinguishes between two types of new
situations with which a group must cope; situations from the
outside environment (which will determine the group'
s
survival) and situations dealing with internal integration
(which determine the group' s ability to function as a
group) . Even though it is possible to distinguish between
the two, they are highly interrelated - Table 2.1 summarizes
the internal and external tasks (Schein, 1990) . As the
environment continues to change and internal affairs require
management, the culture perpetually evolves and changes to
meet new challenges. This is not to say that the stable,
basic assumptions of a cultural paradigm will change to fit
the whims of an unstable environment. Because the basic
assumptions of the group are established partly for the
purpose of fulfilling the human need for consistency and
order, and because stability is a defense against
inconsistency and confusion, deep, unconscious, basic




New members of an organization require
indoctrination so that the culture can be passed on and new
TABLE 2 .
1




1. The core mission, functions, and primary tasks of
the organization vis-a-vis its environments.
2. The specific goals to be pursued by the
organization.
3 The basic means to be used in accomplishing the
goals
.
4. The criteria to be used in accomplishing the goals.






The common language and conceptual system to be
used, including basic concepts of time and space.
2. The group boundaries and criteria for inclusion.
3. The criteria for the allocation of status, power,
and authority.
4. The criteria for intimacy, friendship, and love in
different work and feimily settings.
5. The criteria for the allocation of rewards and
punishments
.
6. Concepts for managing the unmanageable- ideology and
religion.
members assimilated into the group. Although new members
bring in new ideas and can produce cultural change
(especially if they are brought in at high levels) it is
unclear in the literature whether "new" elements are truly
new assumptions or merely new artifacts built on old
assumptions (Schein, 1984) . It seems clear that introducing
new artifacts is culturally less disturbing than introducing
new, or changing old, assumptions
.
Because culture pervades to the unconscious level of
the individual group member, the learning of a culture
involves more of a member' s unconscious responses to
situations; the older the culture and the longer a member
has belonged to it, the greater the influence the culture
will has on the member (Schein, 1985)
.
5 . Culture as a Group Phenomenon
In order for a group to "own" a culture, it is
necessary for it to:
1
.
have been together long enough to have shared
significant problems,
2 have solved those problems by either relying on
formerly established basic assioitiptions or
formulating new ones, and




These three requirements ensure that the group has had the
opportunity to establish and test its own consensus on and
commitment to a set of basic assumptions (Schein, 1984)
.
B. THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR CULTURE
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that
culture is not easily changed, but more importantly, a
culture's basic assumptions are a pervasive force that
affects the organization in which the culture "lives." The
greater the number of shared assumptions, the more
widespread and pervasive these assumptions are, and the
greater the degree the assumptions are ordered or ranked in
terms of importance, determines the strength of a culture
and its impact on the organization (Sathe, 1983) . Because
an organization's culture has the potential for being either
an asset or a liability, influencing organizational
communication, personnel commitment, and decision making, it
is important to understand a culture if any organizational
changes are being contemplated (Sathe, 1983)
.
Dennison found evidence that an organization's culture
does affect an organization's performance. He compared the
level of two cultural characteristics; participative
management (the linking of individual goals to the goals of
the organization) , and the degree of work organization, in
"34 large American firms" (Dennison, 1984) from 25 different
industries over five years. Dennison did not define the
11
term "large", but he used responses from a total of 43,747
employees in the 34 firms as evidence in his study. The
level of participative management and organization of work
was determined for each firm by a survey of questions
indexed on a Likert scale. Once the degree of participation
and organization of work was determined, these cultural
indicators were compared to each firm' s income investment
ratio (which indicated the effective use of resources over
time) and income sales ratio (which indicated general
operating efficiency) . Each firm' s income investment ratio
and income sales ratio were computed from financial
information from Standard and Poor' s statistical service and
compared to income investment and income sales ratios of
other firms in the sajne industry. Dennison found that
companies that scored high in levels of participative
management and work organization consistently had a
competitive edge in income investment ratio and income sales
ratio within their particular industry (Dennison, 1984)
.
The notion that a corporate culture can provide a
competitive edge in organizational performance has led to
the pxiblication of literature (Deal and Kennedy, 1982;
Peters and Waterman, 1982; Ouchi, 1981) advocating the
changing of organizational cultures to give organizations a
competitive business edge. The utility of changing an
organization's culture will be explored in some depth in
subsequent sections of this paper. Suffice it to say at
12
this point that an unconsidered attempt by management to
rapidly change an organization's culture will, at the least
be costly and difficult, and most probably be a failure.
The real value in understanding culture is for the manager
who, when faced with apparently irrational group behavior,
can understand how group consensus on basic assumptions is
more powerful than a conflict of values or inconsistent
behavior. Knowledge of an organization's basic assumptions
can help a manager anticipate trouble-spots and do a more
effective job of planning and controlling.
Because culture exerts itself most noticeably when
unconscious, taken- for-granted assumptions are violated
(Wilkins, 1983) the introduction of any far-reaching change
strategy, that has the potential for changing a paradigm of
assumptions, should assess a group's basic assumptions
before changes are introduced. Any resistance to the change
may then be anticipated and a plan for dealing with specific
areas of resistance devised. Methods for implementing
change and dealing with resistance to change are explained
in subsequent chapters of this paper.
C. HOW TO STUDY A CULTXmE
Various methodologies for assessing the basic
assumptions of an organization are identified in the
literature (Schein, 1985; Sathe, 1983; Wilkins, 1983;
Schwartz and Davis, 1981) . Other methodologies, from the
13
anthropological school, ignore the level of basic
assumptions and advocate assessing a culture by determining
its artifacts and values then attempting to change those
artifacts and values for the purpose of achieving a
competitive advantage in the work place. This second series
of methodologies, exemplified by Deal and Kennedy (1982)
does not provide complete information for the manager
interested in estimating an organization' s reaction to a
change strategy. Therefore, this paper will explore only
those methodologies which seek to assess an organization's
basic assumptions.
Uncovering or assessing cultural assumptions presents
three major problems. The first problem is that people may
not speak directly of assumptions (assumptions are by
definition unconscious) but rather imply them through
examples (Wilkins, 1983) (e.g., "If he keeps up that
attitude, he won't make it here," or "What makes you think
you can question the CEO in pxablic?") . Extensive data
collection and exploration of the myriad of cultural
artifacts and value-laden statements must be conducted in
order to accurately understand the content of basic
assumptions that give rise to a culture' s overt
manifestations. The second major problem that a cultural
assessment must deal with is that some assumptions
contradict overtly stated norms or values and people are
reluctant to admit such contradictory values (Wilkins,
14
1983) . For example, a specific organizational assumption,
such as winning at all costs, may be in direct conflict with
the American social norm of giving assistance to the weak;
it may be hard for a member to admit adherence to the
contradictory values. The third problem is that the
diversity and size of an organization may cause subcultures
to form. An assessment conducted on an organizational
subculture does not necessarily reflect the assumptions of
other organizational subcultures and may affect the validity
of the assessment. If the assessment is directed at the
wrong subculture, the assumptions identified by the
assessment may not apply to the subculture of actual
interest (Wilkins, 1983) . Application of any one of the




A detailed methodology for conducting a cultural
assessment, taking into account all phases of an assessment
from initial contact with an unfamiliar organizational
culture to recommendations for reporting results to
management, is presented by Schein. He takes great care to
explain that this methodology does not employ "magic
questions" but seeks to expose the investigator to the
culture in a natural way. In general, the process involves
a team composed of an expert outsider and a knowledgeable
15
insider working together through iterative interviews to
determine the content of an organization' s basic
assumptions. The methodology is composed of ten steps and
is presented here in a generalized form;
Schein provides specific interview and analysis techniques
(Schein, 1985)
.
a. Step 1. Entry and Focus on Surprises
Initially experiencing a culture will present the
outsider with some unexpected behaviors. These surprises
should be noted as they may be symptoms or artifacts of
basic assumptions.
t>. Step 2. Systematic Observation and Checking
The surprise events must be observed repeatedly
in order to indicate true assumptions instead of being
merely random events. The observation of all events must
therefore be systematized and recorded accurately.
c. Step 3. Locating a Motivated Insider
In order to understand what is going on in the
organization, the outsider requires the partnership of a
motivated, analytically competent insider. Often the best
insider is the one that has requested, or is interested in,
the process.
d. Step 4. Revealing Surpristes and Hunches
With the insider-outsider relationship
estcLblished, the outsider can reveal his or her
16
observations, questions, and theories about the culture to
the insider. The insider must be ready to hear what may
sound like judgmental observations and be able to discuss
those observations in a nondefensive manner.
e. Step 5. Joint Exploration to Find Explanation
An initial exploration results in joint agreement
over what the basic assumptions seem to be. During this
initial exploration it is necessary to cover all the
culture's problems of internal and external adaptation (see
Table 2.1) as well as all of the general underlying
assumptions around which cultural paradigms form (Table 2.2)
to ensure all aspects of the culture are covered. The seven
underlying dimensions of an organizational culture in Table
2.2 were chosen by Schein based on typological studies of
Southwest United States cultures (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck,
1961) and dimensions which Schein considered necessary
through his experience in understanding corporate cultures
(Schein, 1985) . Applying concrete observations to these
dimensions and asking the related questions serves to define
the unconscious, basic assumptions. The outsider assumes
the role of a social psychologist interviewer helping the





Some Underlying Dimensions of Organizational Culture
Schein (1985)
Dimension of Cultural Paradigms
Dl. The organization's relationship to its environment
D2
.
The nature of human activity
D3. The nature of reality and truth
D4 The nature of time
D5 The nature of human nature
D6. The nature of human relationships
D7 Homogeneity vs. diversity
Questions to be Answered
Dl . Does the organization perceive itself to be
dominant, siobmissive, harmonizing, searching out a
niche?
D2 . Is the "correct" way for humans to behave to be
dominant /pro-active, harmonizing, or
passive/ fatalistic?
D3 . How do we define what is true and what is not true;
and how is truth ultimately determined both in the
physical and social world? By pragmatic test,
reliance on wisdom, or social consensus?
D4. What is our basic orientation in terms of past,
present, and future, and what kinds of time units
are most relevant for the conduct of daily affairs?
D5. Are humans basically good, neutral, or evil, and is
human nature perfectible or fixed?
D6. What is the "correct" way for people to relate to
each other, to distribute power and affection? Is
life competitive or cooperative? Is the best way to
organize society on the basis of individualism or
groupism? Is the best authority system
autocratic/participative?
D7 . Is the group best off if it is highly diverse or if
it is highly homogeneous, and should individuals in
a group be encouraged to innovate or conform?
18
f. step 6. Formalizing Hypotheses
The assumptions that result from Step 5 are still
only hunches about the organization's culture. They must be
formalized into hypotheses and agreement between the insider
and outsider be reached on valid tests of the hypotheses.
Tests could include expected behaviors that will be observed
if an assumption holds, or operational values that could be
derived from the assumption.
g. Step 7. Systematic Checking and Consolidation
Evidence to accept or reject the hypotheses is
now collected. Collection techniques involve formal
interviews, questionnaires, document content analysis,
systematic observation and other techniques for gathering
social data.
h. Step 8. Pushing to the Level of Asstunptions
This is generally one of the most difficult steps
in any cultural assessment, for it is now that the basic
assumptions are deciphered from the confirmed hypotheses.
This is accomplished by attempting to state clearly what
assumption is operating within each confirmed hypothesis.
Only when the outsider can correctly predict insider
reaction to circiimstances based on the predicted assumptions
can the outsider be sure that the assumptions are correctly
identified.
19
i. Step 9. Perpetual RecalUbration
Two sources for recalibration include new data
and new insider participation. New data must be treated in
the same iterative manner as previously discussed. Other
insiders can add valuable insights, but they must possess
personal and analytical skills in order to comprehend the
assumptions and not become defensive or embarrassed while
discussing them.
J. Step 10. Formal Written Description
The analysis is tied together by articulating all
the assumptions in writing and showing how they relate to
each other to form the cultural paradigms. An important
consideration is to whom and for what reasons the analysis
should be released. Unguided disclosure within and outside
the organization could yield unpredictc±>le results.
2. Sathe's Methodology
Sathe (1983) proposes a method of cultural diagnosis
which identifies important shared understandings (what
Schein refers to basic assumptions) from shared things,
shared sayings, shared doings, and shared feelings (what
Schein refers to as artifacts and values) (see Figure 2.1)
(Sathe, 1983) . Each important shared understanding in
Figure 2.1 is inferred from one or more of the shared
things, sayings
, doings, and feelings (the observable




ST2 . One-company town.
ST3. Open offices.
Shared Sayings
551. "Get out there" to understand the customer.
(Belief in travel)
552. "We cannot rely on systems" to meet customer
needs. (Highly responsive customer service)
553. "We don't stand on rank." (No parking privileges)
Shared Doings
SDl. Participate in lots of meetings.
SD2 . Make sure organization is detailed-oriented to
provide quality customer service.
SD3 . Engage in personal relationships and
communications
.
SD4 . Rally to meet customer needs in a crisis.
SD5 . Expedite jobs to deliver highly responsive
service
.
SD6. Maintain close relationship with union.
Shared Feeling
SFl . The company is good to me.
SF2 . We like this place.
SF3 . We care about this company because it cares about
us as individuals.
Important Shared Understandings
1. Provide highly responsive, quality customer service
(SSI, SS2, SD2, SD5)
.
2. Get things done well and quickly ("expediting")
(SSI, SDl, SD4, SD5)
3. Operating informally (STl, SS3, SD3, SD6)
.
4. Perceive company as part of the family (ST2, SD6,
SFl, SF2, SF3)
.
5. Encourage constructive disagreement (ST3, SDl).
Figure 2 .
1
Inferring Important Shared Understanding From Shared Things,
Shared Sayings, Shared Doing, and Shared Feelings
Sathe (1983)
21
different list may be defined for any given culture, the
important point is to distill the long list of
manifestations to a shorter list of shared understandings
(Sathe, 1983) . This methodology differs in detail from
Schein's methodology, but is similar in that observable




Wilkins focuses on two general areas when performing
a cultural assessment: implied work assumptions and implied
reward/punishment assumptions (Wilkins, 1983) . Implied work
assumptions include assumptions about work "ends" (goals
that should be accomplished by a culture's work) and work
"means" (how work goals are to be accomplished) . Implied
reward assumptions include the degree to which individual
interests are served and the degree to which people are
treated equitably (Wilkins. 1983). Wilkins interprets
ass\imptions within these two general areas as sets of
explicit social contracts (defined by procedures or
regulations) and implicit social contracts (not formally
defined) within the organization. In Schein's terminology,
the explicit contracts are defined as values while the
implicit contracts are assumptions. Wilkins' focus on
assumptions as implied contracts between personnel may
provide an advantage for the cultural assessment that is
22
particularly designed to discover the responsibilities that
members of a culture are expected to assume.
4. SchKartz and Davis' Methodology
Schwartz and Davis propose that a cultural
assessment be done by describing the way tasks are handled
in the context of key relationships (Figure 2.2) (Schwartz
and Davis, 1981) . Their purpose for accomplishing a
cultural assumptions assessment is to determine if a
specific strategic change proposal will be culturally suited
to a given organization; a cultural fit is necessary for the
change to be successful (Schwartz and Davis, 1981)
.
Relating organizational tasks and organizational member
relationships, they say, establishes a framework for
thinking through the relationship between characteristics of
the organizational culture and the proposed changes in tasks
and relationships which are required to ensure the success
of the proposed strategy. The cultural fit of the proposed
change can then be assessed. Figure 2.2 is a worksheet that
can be used to organize the assessment. Each organizational
task (i.e., communicating) is related to the various levels
of relationships (i.e., companywide) to determine how the
organization accomplishes the given task (i.e.,
communicating) . Once all tasks have been evaluated, and a
statement of how each task is performed within the various
relationships is developed, a cultural summary considering
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both relationships and tasks is determined. Figure 2.3
presents an example of a simplified cultural assessment.
The Relationships-Culture Summary is obtained by adding
across the rows of Figure 2.2. The Tasks-Culture Summary is
obtained by adding down the columns of Figure 2.2. Once
broken down in this dual perspective, cultural assumptions
are identified as pertaining to tasks, relationships, or






























Allow area managers to run the business




Guard information; it is power.
Be a gentleman or lady.
Protect your department's bottom line.












Be a quick second.




Involve the right people.
Seize the opportunity.




Be a gentleman or lady.
Centralize power.
Be autocratic.
Meet short-term profit goals.
Reward the faithful
.






Summary of Cultural Risk Assessment
(international banking division)
Schwartz and Davis (1981)
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5 . Arroy Corps of Engineers Framework
A cultural analysis of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) was conducted by the Engineer Studies
Center of the USACE in order to assess the assumptions of
USACE and determine if these assumptions were detracting
from USACE effectiveness in a changing environment. The
Engineering Studies Center used an analytical framework
composed of what it defined as basic features common to
every culture. The framework included the basic cultural
features of identity, environment, operations, membership,
and performance criteria (see Appendix B) (Engineering
Studies Center of the USACE, 1987) . Any self analysis such
as this must be done with extreme care; the unconscious
nature of basic cultural assumptions could lead to missing
or misinterpreting certain assumptions. The assessment
methodologies described previously dealt with the problem of
unconscious assiimptions by requiring unbiased outsider
participation as a prerequisite for a cultural assessment.
In view of the evidence in the literature, the success of
any self analysis may be questioned.
D. USING A CULTURAL ASSESSMENT
Once a culture has been assessed, how the cultural data
are used is dependent upon the needs of the client. Perhaps
a client is assessing the organizational culture to
determine how well the organizational culture fits its
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environment, as was the case in the USAGE study; perhaps a
change in organizational operating procedures has been
mandated and a set of new procedures or an implementation
scheme with the best cultural "fit" is to be chosen.
Wilkins suggests that cultural assessments are perhaps best
used for posing the right questions than for providing clear
answers. The wise manager will use an assessment to gain a




Ill . ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
In studying organizational change it is important to
understand what change is, the relationship change has to
the organization and the possible impacts culture may have
on organizational change. An accepted definition of change
is presented using the Lewin model. Next innovation is
defined as a subset of change and the implications of
innovative change. Then Tichy' s theory of interrelated
cycles of change is presented. The chapter ends with a
definition of resistance to change and how to deal with
resistance to change.
A. DEFINING LEWIN' S MODEL OF CHANGE
According to Lewin (1947) the general theory of change






It is the process of going through these three phases that
change takes place.
Unfreezing, according to Lewin (1947) and reemphasized
by Zand and Sorensen (1975) , is the process of getting
support and receptivity of the organization for the change
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in the distribution and balance of social forces. According
to Schein (1964) this occurs by means of:
1. disconfirmation,
2. psychological support, and occasionally,
3. guilt anxiety.
Disconfirmation is the feedback of ineffectiveness that can
be improved with a reasonable amount of effort. Zand and
Sorensen (1975) suggest this feedback may vary in source,
form, and method of transmittal, for example, (a) objective
measurements of productive output showing that the intended
level of production was not achieved, (b) social comparison
measured in either C[ualitative or subjective means showing
that one's performance is inferior to someone else's
performance, (c) information from meaningful others, such
as, superior, peers, or subordinates, that one's intended
outcome is not being attained, (d) criticism from meaningful
others stressing that one's behavior is unacceptable
compared to the accepted ideal behavior. According to Zand
and Sorensen (1975) psychological support provides
confidence that change is possible and that one has the
physical and mental resources to surmount the problems
associated with the up coming change. Guilt anxiety,
according to Schein (1964) , increases the feelings of shame




Moving is altering the driving and resistant forces of
the change. According to Lewin (1947) this will
consequently shift the equilibrium of the driving and
resisting forces to a different and new level. Zand and
Sorensen (1975) suggests that this is concerned with
understanding and thinking about the problem, collecting
information about the relevant sources, pinpointing or
developing alternative solutions, and choosing the course of
action. For example, a company would collect all relevant
information concerning a desired change. Then the company
would decide using standard company policy what solution is
most appropriate. Once the plan of attack is decided, the
company would proceed to implement the plan for change.
This process is known as moving.
Refreezing (Lewin, 1947; Zand and Sorensen, 1975) is
gaining a new stable social equilibrium within the
organization, by reinforcing the new accepted distribution
of driving and resistant forces. Schein (1964), suggests
this occurs through confirmation, psychological support, and
heightened confidence. Confirmation is feedback that
performance is effective. It may come from one of three
sources
:
1. objective measurements, from others that verify a
new level of effectiveness has been achieved.
30
2.
social comparison showing that performance has
eofualled or exceeded that of another social unit,
and
3. one's own perception and interpretations of the new
level of effectiveness.
Psychological support is an emotional climate that leads one
to feel satisfaction and pleasure with the new behavior and
level of effectiveness. Heightened confidence is
demonstrated by transferring monitoring and control of the
new behavior to the one being changed and encouraging others
to adopt the new behavior following his advice and guidance
(Zand and Sorensen, 1975) . The Lewin model, unfreezing,
moving and refreezing, describes the process of a given
organizational change within any organization.
Zand and Sorensen (1975) found that projects that had a
predominate level of favorcible forces in the three phases:
unfreezing, moving, and unfreezing were more successful,
which suggest successful change would tend to follow the
Lewin model. The change efforts studied were management
science related projects (Zand and Sorensen analyzed the
inputs from 154 questioners they sent out to project
managers) . However, Zand and Sorensen (1975) stated that
their findings are relevant and generalizable to change
efforts in other areas of study. Appendix C, shows forces
that are favorcible and unfavorable on each of the three
phases of Lewin' s model of change, based on their research.
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B . INNOVATION
An important subset of the type of changes, that can
take place within an organization, is innovation. Thompson
(1965) , summarized by Pierce and Delbecq (1977) , defines
innovation as "...the generation, acceptance and
implementation of a new process, products, or services for
the first time within an organization setting."
Carroll (1967) views innovation as a social process of
organizational adaptation. Pierce and Delbecq (1977)
suggest, organizational innovation represents a major change
in the structure and/or procedures, or an operating system,
which require a major shift in behavior.
According to Shepard (1967) , organizational innovation
then can be thought of as an organizational act of doing
something that it had not known how to do in the past.
Thompson's (1967) model suggests that there are three




Pierce and Delbecq (1977) suggest that initiation of an idea
or proposal will cause some type of change to take place
within an organization. Adoption of an idea or proposal is
the acceptance of the idea or proposal by the appropriate
organization decision makers, who have committed the
required resources to the change process. Implementation is
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the establishment of the adopted idea or proposal within the
organization. This model was used by Pierce and Delbecq
(1977) to determine the factors that favor or hinders
organizational innovation. Pierce and Delbecq (1977) found
that there are three general types of variables that
facilitate innovation:
1. structural variables consisting of differentiation,
professionalism, decentralization, and formulation,
2. contextual variables consisting of environmental
uncertainty, size, and age, and
3. stand alone variables which are attitudes and
values, which are dependent on the individuals
within the organization.
Pierce and Delbecq (1977) suggest that higher levels of









6. job satisfaction and job involvement,
7. performance dissatisfaction,
8. intrinsic motivation, and
9. values of strategic decision makers.
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Where higher levels of the following variables hinder or
negatively affect organizational innovation: formalization,
stratification, and age (the older the organization)
.
During adopting and implementing an innovation within
an organization a more formalized and bureaucratic
organization had a higher success rate in implementing the
innovative change, due to the formality of the chain of
command according to Pierce and Delbecq (1977)
.
C. TICHY'S THREE ORGANIZATIONAL CYCLES
Tichy (1983) argues that organizations do not follow
predictable stages of development such as childhood,
adolescence, and adulthood. He suggests organizations have
three interrelated cycles. These cycles are based on the
dynamic of social systems surviving and making adjustments
in various contexts. The three cycles are technical,
political, and cultural.
According to Tichy (1983) the first dilemma is the
technical design problem. The organization faces production
problems; social and technical resources must be arranged so
that the organization produces some desired output. The
second dilemma is political, the problem of allocating power
and resources. This is the power struggle between managers
within a organization that will ultimately decide who will
acquire the power and resources from within a organization.
The third dilemma is the ideological and cultural mix
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problem. Organizations are, in part, held together by the
sharing of specific major beliefs by its members. Hence,
the organization must determine what values need to be held
by what people. Since organizations are dynamic none of
these problems are ever solved and the cycles go through a
series of peaks and valleys depending on the uncertainty
within in a given cycle, as shown in Figure 3.1. The cycles
are interrelated and the combination of many internal and
external factors lead to the need for an organizational
change
.
According to Tichy (1980) technical uncertainty is
related to production issues. When a manager within an
organization does not have enough information to make
decisions the uncertainty is high. Rapid changes in the
environment, complex tasks, and highly independent tasks are
the major contributors to high technical uncertainty.
Political uncertainty is related to who has the power to
issue rewards and decide what the organizations goals will
be. The political cycle peaks when uncertainty is high.
Cultural uncertainty is related to the values and ideology
differences of the organization members.
Tichy (1980) argues that organizational uncertainty is
triggered by two actions. The first is events that are
external and independent of the cycles, technical,










of the cycles itself and may or may not trigger the other
two cycles.
Tichy' s (1980) five suggested areas that are external
and independent of the cycles that may trigger change are:
1. environmental change that lead to increased
complexity and unpredictability,
2. technological changes that have the potential for
new products or services and/or new methodologies
for producing existing products and services,
3. shifts in the goals of the organization due to the
agreement among the organizational members,
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4. shifts in the means of getting the work done in the
organization due to the agreement among the
organizational members, and
5. changes in people who differ in some significant way
from existing members, such as, women and minorities
brought into white, male dominated organizations.
As shown in Figure 3.2 environmental changes will
trigger changes in the technical, political and cultural
cycles. Uncertainty in the environment causes high levels of
stress and a simultaneous adjustment in all three cycles to
cope with the stress. Technological changes will usually
only impact the technological cycle, whereas the shift in
goals and methods, the way of doing business, in
organizations will impact the political cycle. For example,
the invention of air bags outside of a given company will
cause the given company to try to invent their own air bags
.
A second example is that the Japanese way of doing business
may cause a company to try to copy the Japanese techniques
.
Changes in people will impact the culture cycle, because
this deals with personal and organization values; a shift in
policy to hire people from a different age group could lead
to a shift in organizational values.
The second set of triggers, are internal within the
cycles themselves according to Tichy (1980) . The cycles are
dialectical in nature and cause counteractions in one
another. For example, a substantial technical change, often
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Need for Change in the Following Areas:


















Triggering the Change Process
Tichy (1980)
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triggers a political shift, because various individuals
careers and power bases have been altered. This will in
turn alter the cultural cycle, by allowing the member's
values and norms to change to fit with the changed technical
and political environment.
Our research apparently indicates that when implementing
a change one needs to realize that a change is more complex
than it appears on the surface. It may have an impact that
could reverberate throughout the organization. Tichy (1983)
insists that when a change is being made one should
understand how it will impact the overall organization.
D. REASONS FOR RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
Lorsch (1976) argues that one of the common problems
when initiating a organizational change is human resistance
to the change. Lawrence (1969) suggests resistance to
change can take on many forms, for example, reduction in
output, request of transfer, strikes, increase number of
walkouts, and various pseudo-logical reasons why the
initiated change will not work. McMurry (1947) indicates
honest and loyal workers and executives will sometimes lie,
misrepresent, and engage in outright saJDotage of the new
procedures. He also suggests even innovations which are
obviously advantageous are not welcomed with open arms . An
example, is the frequent reaction of white employees to the
introduction of blacks into the work force.
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The above are the symptoms of resistance to change, but
it is more important to understand the underlying reasons
why employees may resist change. McMurry (1947) and Kotter
(1979) argue fear is a reason for employees to resist
change. It is fear of not being able to learn the new
skills or behavior that are now required of them. In simple
terms, this is the fear of the unknown. The employees are
resisting, because they are unsure of what new skills or
behavior will be required. Drucker (1954) has pointed out
that the major threat to organizational change is the
inability of changing one's attitudes and behaviors.
McMurry (1947) suggests fear is deep seated, and perhaps
could even be an unconscious reaction.
Politics and power struggles are another source of
resistance to change (Zaleznik and Manfred, 1975; Miles, 1978,
and Kotter, 1979) . People resist organizational change
because they see that they are going to lose something of
personal value. Resistance of this type is called political
because people are only concerned cQDOut their own interests
not that of the whole organization. According to Kotter
(1979) and Schein (1965) political behavior sometimes takes
the form of two or more armed camps publicly fighting it
out . They also suggest resistance is usually much more
subtle. In many cases, it occurs completely under the
surface of public exchange.
40
Argyris (1970) suggests people resist change due to
misunderstanding and a lack of trust. Such situations,
often occur when people are unable to conceive the full
intentions of the change or when trust is lacking in the
change initiator employee relationship (Kotter, 1979).
Kotter (1979) suggests that, not many organizations can
claim there is a high level of trust between employees and
managers. This is why a high level of misunderstanding or
lack of trust can lead to resistance.
Different assessments of the situation is another common
reason people resist organizational change (Kotter, 197 9)
.
The analysis of the initiator differs from the those who
will have to make the change. Kotter (1979) argues that,
individuals who must make the change typically see more
costs than benefits resulting from the change not only for
themselves, but for the company as a whole. Kotter also
suggest that those who initiate change assume that
individuals who will be affected by the change have the same
basic facts as they do. When in reality those who are
affected by the change do not have the same facts at all.
Other reasons for resistance of organizational change
are discussed by Duncan (1977) and supported by Kotter
(1979). They include: saving face, peer group pressure, and
supervisor's resistant attitude. Resistance to
organizational change can be caused by one or a combination
of any of the above reasons. It also appears that employees
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do not resist technical change in and of itself, but rather
to social and human considerations supported by arguments by
Lawrence (1954)
.
E. TACTICS TO DEAL WITH RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
1 . Kotter' s Tactics
Kotter (1979) suggests there are several tactics for
dealing with resistance to change. They include: education
and communication, participation, facilitation and support,
negotiation, co-optation, manipulation, and coercion. He
also suggests that a manager will use a combination of two
or more of these tactics to reduce the resistance that may
be experienced. The use of one tactic alone may not be
enough accomplish a given change.
Some of the tactics (i.e., manipulation and coercion) as
reviewed by Kotter could raise ethical c[uestions. The
purpose of this paper is to present his information on
tactics in an cimoral manner, without making valued
judgement
.
Kotter (1979) argues that communication and education is
the most commonly used tactic in combating resistance to
change. The tactic is used to pass information to people,
spelling out the reason for the change. Education and
communication can be ideal when resistance is based on
inadequate or inaccurate information and analysis.
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especially if the initiators need the resistor's help in
implementing the change.
The participation tactic is the use of possible
resistors in the design and implementation phases of a
change. As Kotter (197 9) points out, participation is a
rational choice of tactics when change initiators believe
they do not have all the information they need to design and
implement a change. When commitment is needed for a change
this is a good tactic as discussed by Marrow, Bowers, and
Seashore (1967)
.
Facilitation and support is another tactic when dealing
with resistance. "As a tactic, it might include providing
training in new skills, giving employees time off after a
demanding period, or simply listening and providing
emotional support." (Kotter, 1979) This tactic is best
suited for organizational changes that require major
adjustments
.
Another tactic is negotiation. Kotter (1979) suggests
this tactic involves buying out active or potential
resisters. This tactic is best suited for those situations
where someone is going to lose something due to the
organizational change and has the power to become a major
resistor. Nierenberg (1974) also suggests negotiations is a
very helpful way in dealing with resistors.
According to Kotter (1979) co-optation, the placement of
desirable individuals in a suitable role within the change
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process, as a tactic can take place on one of two levels.
Either on an individual or group level . The individual
level involves giving the individual a desirable role in the
design or implementation phase of the change. The group
level involves giving one of the leaders of the group a
major role in the design and implementation phase. This can
be easier or cheaper to implement than negotiation and/or
participation under certain circumstances, according to
Kotter (1979)
.
In this context manipulation is defined as the covert
attempts of the organizational change initiators to get
resistors to accept the change. Kotter {1979) suggests
manipulation can work and be used successfully, particularly
when all other tactics are not feasible or have failed.
The last tactic is coercion. Coercion is the
enforcement of change upon employees to accept the given
change. Explicitly or implicitly threatening them with the
loss of jobs, or promotion possibilities, or raises, or
whatever else they control according to Kotter (1979) . He
also suggests, coercion has the advantage of overcoming
resistance very quickly, however this could be a very risky
tactic, because unless the organization is use to this kind
of approach employees may sabotage or counter the change
with work stoppages, strikes, etc...
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2 . Using a Change Agent
Lawrence (1969) suggests the best way to deal with
resistance is through the use of a change agent. A change
agent is someone that the people of a organization can trust
and with whom they can share their concerns. It also is
someone that upper management has the same feelings. There
are five things a change agent must do to accomplish a
successful organizational change according to Lawrence
(1969) :
1. See the big picture. (Understand what is for the
best of the organization.)
2
.
Use understandable terms that the work force
understands as well as upper management.
3. Look for and cope with resistance.
4. Use real participation, based on respect. (Not just
lip service.
)
5 Top management must manage the change agent as the
change agent must manage operators. (The change
agent needs to know that top management is
supporting what he is doing.)
Lawrence's (1969) approach is basically using the
combination of Kotter' s (1979) tactics of education and
communication, participation, and facilitation and support.
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By understanding what change is and the reasons for
resisting change, it is possible to use a combination of





A. APPROPRIATE CHANGE STRATEGY
To determine the appropriate change strategy, one needs
to take into account the complex set of trade-offs among
structure, systems, people, and culture (Schwartz and Davis
1981) . The key to any successful change is the ability of
an organization to read its own culture and use it to
implement the desired change. Schwartz and Davis (1981)
suggest that in any organization undertaking a major
strategic change, success depends on the proper combination
of organizational structure, management systems, and people
with the culture to produce the desired behavior. Since
culture is one of the major elements in determining the
course a strategic change may take, strategic change must
take into account the culture, within which the change will
take place. Approaches that run counter to the cultural
norms will encounter resistance (Schwartz and Davis, 1981)
.
In the literature there are two theories of viewing
organizational culture and developing a strategic change
strategy. As categorized by Gilbert and Roberts (1984),
they are instrumental view and navigational view of
organizational culture.
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1 . Instrumental Viev
The assumption of the instrumental view of
organizational culture is culture is an instrument, a
collection of techniques in general management's hands.
Deal and Kennedy (1984), suggest levers such as:
symbols, rites and rituals, heroes, and values, can be used
to shape the culture to implement managements strategic
change strategies. This strategy of pulling levers is based
on the premise that to make a strategic change one would
pull a lever within the culture to implement the change. In
essence this suggests that culture must change before a
strategic change can take place.
Spellman (1988) builds on the ideas of Deal and
Kennedy (1984) and suggests seven methods in shaping a
culture for organizational change:
1. creation of a vision,
2. communication of the vision and the values that go
along with that vision,
3. socialization of new organizational members,
4. role modeling by the organization's leaders,
5. use of the reward system to reinforce the desired
values,
6. symbolic management, and
7. organization rites and rituals
-
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a. Creation of a. Vision
The creation of a vision is the first step in
developing the desired culture. According to Pettigrew
(1979) visions are not just the goals and purpose of the
organization. They also include the system of beliefs and
language which gives the organization its texture. The
vision will have an implied sacredness that will also define
roles, activities, challenges, and purpose of all members.
In doing this a new wanted culture is defined for the
organization. A leader must employ the skills of visionary,
orator, and inspirational leader when initiating a vision
for the organization (Spellman, 1988) . Hickman and Silva
(1984) and Spellman (1988) suggest that for a leader to
establish a vision for an organization the leader must be
cible to see the future wanted state from a set of facts,
figures, hopes, dreeuns, dangers, and opportunities.
Jb. Cottununicatxon of the Vision
Communication of the vision can be done through
either explicit or implicit forms of communication. The
explicit form of communication is done through the use of
formal meetings, written documents and memorandums, and any
other formal media approach (Spellman, 1988) . Implicit
forms of communication include Deal and Kennedy's (1984) use
of the cultural network, rites, rituals, and rewards.
Schein (1985) argues the best way of communicating a desired
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cultural change is based on the manager's focus of
attention. It is not so much what forms of communication
are used, (i.e., explicit or implicit) but the way they are
used to reinforce, measure, or control desired cultural
shifts
.
c. Socialization of New Members
Socializing new members into the organization is
used primarily to develop and maintain the desired culture.
As emphasized by Schein (1984) culture stcdDilizes the
external and internal environment for the organization. It
also must be taught to new members. Culture cannot serve
its purpose and function if new members were allowed to
present their own perceptions, language, thinking patterns,
and rules and interaction. The culture must be perceived as
proper and valid, thus it must be taught to all new members
of the organization. As suggested by Spellman (1988) , for
an individual to be committed to the organization and buy
into its value system, the organization needs to show
concern for the new member's needs. An organization that
instills a strong, consistent set of implicit knowledge, is
effectively estaiblishing a common law to supplement its
statutory laws. This is all best done during the initial
socialization of the new members, which can be anywhere from




d. RoIb Modeling by Leaders
Role modeling by leaders is a powerful tool in
developing a new culture or changing one's culture. Schein
(1985) suggests a wanted culture shift can be achieved when
leaders demonstrate the desired values, not in what is
written down or inferred from designs and procedures.
Silverzweig and Allen (1976), go as far as to suggest it is
not even what managers or leaders actually do, but what it
is perceived that they value. Beyer and Trice (1987)
suggest managers and leaders must be aware of their actions
and the implications of the actions on the organizational
culture. They should also modify their actions if required
to get the desired culture.
e. Use of Reward System
The use of rewards can help shape the culture
according to Tichy and Ulrich (1984) and Baker (1980) . They
suggest the use of rewards as reinforcement by
organizational leaders can achieve the desired strategic
change. Positive reenforcement is a very effective tool in
changing an organization's culture in that it informs and
encourages the employees of an organization to pursue the
activities wanted by the organization. Thus unconsciously
changing the values and norms of the organization and in the
long run changing the culture to accept the strategic
change. Schein (1985) suggests the rewards for positive and
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negative behavior provides the evidence about what the
underlying assumptions are.
f. Symbolic Management
The use of symbols to communicate the
organizational culture is a very effective tool. It is done
through the use of myths, stories, metaphors, heroes, and
mottoes. The shapers of organizational culture use these to
shape the values and norms of an organization (Deal and
Kennedy, 1982) . Kotter (1982) suggests that managers and
leaders of organizations, that were successful, used symbols
indirectly to influence the culture to achieve strategic
change. Etzioni (1964) suggests there are three types of
control in organizations: physical, material, and symbolic.
He further suggests that symbolism is the most effective
tool when setting up a shared set of values and norms among
the members of an organization. However, within
bureaucracies symbolic management may have a less of a role
due to the need of a bureaucracy to depend on a set of
norms, rules and regulations to function effectively.
g. Rites and Rituals
Rites and rituals is the last method for shaping
and changing an organizations culture. According to Beyer
and Trice (1987) and Deal and Kennedy (1982) rites and
rituals include award ceremonies, meetings, going away
parties, office luncheons, and other functions. The purpose
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of rites and rituals is to communicate the values and norms
of the organization to its members. According to Spellman
(1988) rites and rituals cut across all other methods of
shaping organizational culture and are effective tools in
communicating the organization's vision.
The seven methods of changing organizational culture
to improve the success of a strategic change are best used
in various forms of combination depending on the present
culture of the organization. According to Spellman (1988),
"The leader's challenge, then, is to use organizational
culture and the 'art' of management to develop a vibrant,
healthy organization that is governed by a set of shared
meanings and values .
"
2 . Navigational View
Navigational view of organizational culture, is a
speculative argviment that culture cannot be changed before a
strategic change can take place (Gilbert and Roberts, 1984)
.
Navigational view suggests strategic change will change the
organizational culture in the long run. Cultural changes
are a product of organizational strategic change. The best
that a manager can expect to do is manage around the culture
by cajoling, persuading, channeling, nudging, and try to
guide the organizational culture in the desired direction.
According to Schwartz and Davis (1981)
organizational change strategies that run counter to an
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existing culture are at high risk of failure. They suggest
that it is better to manage around the culture than to try
and change it. They stated that if one tries to change a
culture it will take too long and the change strategy will
never get off the ground. They also suggest that there is a
way to determine the amount of risk a change strategy will
encounter by using a matrix approach. By getting a clear
vision of the strategic change and measuring the strategy
against the importance to the strategy and level of culture
compatibility one can determine how to manage around the
culture. (Matrix shown in Figure 4.1.)
According to Schwartz and Davis (1981) when using
the matrix in Figure 4.1 in determining the importance of
each organizational approach to strategy they asked two
questions, " (1) What specific behavior is the organizational
approach designed to encourage?" and " (2) How is this
behavior linked to critical success factors?" To determine
the strategies compatibility with the culture they asked the
following questions: "How much change is involved in key
tasks and relationships? How adapts±>le is the culture? How
skilled is the management?" After determining the answers
to the cibove questions a manager should be aible to determine
how important the strategy is to the organization and the
level of compatibility with the organization's culture. By
plotting the importance of the strategy and compatibility
with culture on the matrix a manager should be able to
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determine how risky a new strategy is. Even though it is
unclear in their article on how to measure results of asking
these questions, Schwartz and Davis suggests by using these
questions and the matrix, mangers should be able to
determine where the greatest resistance is and adjust the
strategic change plan to accomplish a higher success rate.
Schwartz and Davis (1981) speculate that there are




manage around the culture by changing the
implementation plan,
3. try to change the culture to fit the strategy, and
4. change the strategy to fit the culture.
They suggest that seldom can culture be ignored, it
is very difficult to change culture prior to making a
strategic change, and it is very difficult to determine what
the organizations culture really is. They further suggest
managing around culture is the easiest and most successful
way of implementing a strategic change. By using the risk
assessment strategy one is more likely to be successful in
implementing a change, because the strategy is taking into
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Schwartz and Davis (19881)
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Gilbert and Roberts (1984) argue that the
navigational approach has three integrated activities:
1
.
build coalitions of key personnel to support the new
values and norms wanted by the new change strategy,
2 the change process should be a forum open to the
major personnel asking for their participation, and
3 create a new structure to serve and sustain the new
change strategy.
The strategy can be done in four steps (Schwartz and
Davis, 1981)
:
1. identify the culture and sub-cultures (which cannot
be 100 percent accurately identified)
,
2. re-identify the culture in terms of managers' tasks
and relationships,
3. assess the cultural risk to the strategic plan, and
4 focus on the high risk area to come up with the
appropriate strategic plan.
The navigational view approach assumes that it is
difficult to actually identify the true culture of an
organization and that it is too long of a process to change
a culture prior to implementing a strategic change. Their
point of view is that it is better to implement a strategic
change working around the culture than to try and change the
culture prior to any strategic change.
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V. RELATING CHANGE AND RESISTANCE TO SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
This section is based on literature which directly
addresses the issues of change and resistance to change as
they apply specifically to information systems
implementation. Issues covered in this chapter include:
1. an explanation of the change approach to
implementation,






5. studies which reinforce the need for user
involvement
,
6. reducing resistance through employee education,
7. countering resistance that arise from the
interaction of personnel and systems,
8 countering resistance that arise from political
sources, and
9. guidelines for improving employee acceptance of a
large-scale, p\iblic sector information system
imp 1ement at i on
.
58
A. THE CHANGE APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION
Technical implementation of an information system
involves a set of interrelated activities referred to by
Zmud and Cox (1979) as the traditional approach to systems
development. This phased approach can be broken down into
steps: initiation, preliminary design, detailed design,
development, conversion (from the old to the new system)
,
and evaluation phases (Zmud and Cox, 1979)
.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s organizational issues
were recognized as having a significant impact on the
information system implementation process; researchers began
studying information system implementation as an
organizational change process and a technique for
implementing information systems as a process of
organizational change was described (Zmud and Cox, 1979)
.
The organizational change approach to systems implementation
was designed to account not only for the technical issues
stressed in the traditional approach, but also non-technical
characteristics of the organization which impact
implementation
.
One way of contrasting the change approach and the
traditional approach is to think in terms of the emphasis
which the two approaches place on the different
implementation phases. While the traditional approach
emphasizes the middle phases (technical design and
development) the change approach emphasizes the early phases
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(initiation and preliminary design) and late phases
(conversion to the new system and evaluation) (Zmud and Cox,
1979) .
Major areas of study in the change approach concentrate
on employee involvement in the implementation effort (users
and managers), employee resistance to implementation, and
ways to reduce employee resistance (Zmud and Cox, 197 9)
.
B. CONDITIONS FAVORING THE CHANGE APPROACH TO
IMPLEMENTAT ION
Zmud and Cox (1979) identified the change approach as
particularly necessary when: the activity involved in the
proposed implementation is poorly defined (e.g., increasing
vertical information flow in a corporation as opposed to a
well-defined activity such as automating transaction
processing) ; the proposed system interfaces with other
organizational automatic data processing systems;
substantial, long-term organizational change is expected to
result from the implementation. System implementations that
favor use of the traditional approach involve systems that:
automate a well-defined procedure; are independent of other
organizational systems; rec[uire little organizational change
(Zmud and Cox, 1979) . Although one may be hard pressed to
think of any information system that meets all the criteria
necessary to favor the strict use of only the traditional
approach, consider that even the traditional approach does
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not completely ignore organizational characteristics and
also that the use of the change approach may be thought of
in terms of degrees on a continuum; the greater the expected
impact on the organization, the more valuable the use of the
change approach. The use of the change approach to implement
a system, when major change in the organization is
anticipated, is consistent with Markus' s (1983) axiom that
the implementation of an information systems by itself is
insufficient for successfully introducing a significant
change into an organization. Should large scale change be
required, Markus (1983) advises first making an assessment
of the organization based on organizational change
techniques (such as a cultural assessment) , followed by a
change in the organization or organizational procedures,
then implementing an information system that is consistent
with the changes. It seems logical however, that any large-
scale change in an organization which depends on an
information system (s) will require changing the information
system (s). The argument for either first changing the
organization or coming up with an appropriate information
system implementation to suit that change is in danger of
becoming circular. We favor considering the information




Employee involvement is an integral part of the change
approach to implementation and the literature explores user
involvement from multiple perspectives . These perspectives
are presented in the following discussion.
1 . Involvement by En^loyee Level amd Development Phase
The degree and type of involvement by various
organizational members in an implementation effort is shown
by Edstrom (1977) and Zmud and Cox (1979) to vary as a
function of both the hierarchical level of the specific
member and the phase of development.
The members Edstrom studied included the user, the
user's functional manager, the system design specialist, and
the design specialist's manager. He conducted interviews
with the system development managers of sixteen companies
and determined from them the smiount of participation of the
various personnel during system implementation. He then
considered the cimount of inputs by these organizational
members and the phase during which the inputs were made . He
then compared the number of inputs and the phase during
which the inputs were made to the success of implementation
(as perceived by the systems development managers) . This
allowed him to make predictions as to which members should
make inputs at what stage for the implementation to have the
highest chance for success.
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Edstrom found that the user is needed in the early
phases, especially in determining the scope of the system
and "must be directly involved with the actual design of the
system not just the overall characteristics" (Edstrom,
1977) . The functional manager and system development
manager contribute most during the initiation phase (by
determining the overall characteristics of the system) . The
system specialist's input can prove counterproductive if it
includes the determination of information needs in the
initiation phase; therefore specialists' input should be
limited to the design and development phases (Edstrom,
1977)
.
Zmud and Cox (1979) broadened Edstrom'
s
classifications of employees to include: top management
(authority over all organization personnel and resources)
;
functional management (authority in the area in which the
system will be implemented) ; operating personnel and
management (actual users of the system) ; systems analyst
(system expert most closely associated with the project)
;
systems personnel (other systems experts associated with the
project) . They also broke Edstrom' s idea of "inputs" into:
consultation (answering questions or giving advice)
;
influence (choosing from eimong design alternatives) ;
commitment (accepting a system as an organizational
obligation) ; responsibility (assuming primary organizational
obligation for a system) . This greater number of
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organizational players and more detailed consideration of
employee inputs allowed for a much more detailed analysis
than the one made by Edstrom.
Table 5.1 shows all prescribed involvements for the
various participants, but several overall conclusions from
Table 5.1 are highlighted by Zmud and Cox (1979):
1. top management's direct role is to develop a sense
of commitment among all participants, especially
during initial phases,
2. functional managers assume responsibility for
coordinating all developmental activities, but have
a relatively smaller role during technical phases,
3. users (operating personnel and managers) make their




system analysts and system personnel are responsible
for technical tasks
.







Role Prescriptions for Implementation Participants

















Project CM R CM 1 CM CM
Initiation
1 R 1 CN 1 CN
Strategic
Design
1 R CM 1 CM CN
Technical
1 1 CN R CM
Design
Develope
1 1 CN R CM
Conversion CN R CM 1 CM 1
Evaluation
1 R CM CN CN CN
R - Responsibility; CM - Commitment; I - Influence; and CN - Consulting.
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2 . Communication
The change approach to implementation depends upon
the acceptance of change through the involvement of
organization members and development of a sense of
commitment between all participants (Zmud and Cox, 1979)
,
and effective communication is at the core of this
dependency
.
Edstrom (1977) found that influence on the
development process was insufficient to correlate with a
high degree of system success without effective
communication between participants; this was particularly
true during the system design and conversion phases
(Edstrom, 1977) . Edstrom (1977) hypothesized that
communication barriers are particularly severe during these
phases due to the conceptualization differences between
technical personnel (systems experts) and
operating personnel and the requirement for close
interaction between these two groups during these stages.
DeBrcibander and Edstrom (1977) propose that the
techno-operational conceptual mismatch can be partly
overcome by formalizing communication and interaction during
the design phase. They argue that formalized communication
decreases conceptual asymmetries, fosters mutual
understanding, and is appropriate for the design phase since
this phase is an exercise in working out the details of what
has already been agreed upon in earlier phases (DeBrabander
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and Edstrom, 1977) . If communication is formalized at the
design phase, operating personnel must be given full
advantage of initiation phase communications to ensure that
their input is completely understood. If not, their
effective participation on the project is threatened, which
then threatens overall project success.
3 . Other Studies of User Involvement
For the most part, other studies of user involvement
reinforce the notion that user involvement has a positive,
even vital impact on the development process (Robey and
Farrow, 1982; Baroudi, Olson, and Ives, 1986/ Ginzberg,
1981) . However, Baronas and Louis (1988) argue that the
vital user issue during implementation is not based on the
necessity of user inputs, but rather on users' perception of
lost control of their environment during changeover to the
new system.
a. Robey and FarroH (1982)
In a study of 130 U.S. and European information
system users, Robey and Farrow (1982) found that
participation in system development led to a perception of
influence, regardless of the phase of development, on the
part of users. They used a constructive conflict model (in
which direct conflict between group members with
incompatible goals is encouraged and used to solve complex,
multi-variable problems) to explain the positive outcomes of
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user participation interactions. They also noted that
participation was only perceived as effective if users were
allowed to exert their influence through both conflict
generation and resolution (Robey and Farrow, 1982) . In
other words, to be effective, user participation must be
perceived by users as having an impact on the final product.
Jb. Baroudi, Olson, and Ives (1986)
Baroudi, Olson, and Ives (1986) conducted a study
of 200 U.S. information system users and established that
user involvement led to greater system usage and user
satisfaction with data (greater system usage and increased
data satisfaction are assumed to ecjuate with a more
successful system) . Ives and Olson (1984) also argued that
user involvement can be viewed as a special case of
participative decision making (in which employees help in
making decisions that will directly affect them) and
therefore leads to increased user acceptance of a system.
As such, user involvement is necessary in order to reduce
resistance and improve acceptance of the changes that system
implementation brings.
c. Baronas and Louis (1986)
Baronas and Louis (1988) argued that Baroudi,
Ives, and Olson did not, in either of the aforementioned
studies, present a theoretically substantiated reason for
why user involvement works. Unable to find any theories
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regarding user involvement in the literature, they theorized
that implementation success was not due to user involvement
with the implementation effort, but rather to the increased
perception of control on behalf of the users that
involvement provided. This led them to propose that
implementation success can be achieved as effectively by
enhancing the perception of user control through symbolic
involvement during conversion to the new system (Baronas and




allowing changes to be realistically anticipated,
2. encouraging discussions about the differences
between the old and new systems among affected
workers and implementors,
3. minimizing surprises by keeping workers informed,
4. assisting in coping with surprises when they arise,
and
5. allowing workers to choose and make decisions
related to the implementation schedule.
Their research involved a treatment group that
was provided with such control-enhancing considerations and
a control group that was not provided any of the
considerations. The results showed that treatment group
members more satisfied with the new system than the control
group (the control group was so dissatisfied with the new
system that they preferred the old system) and managers of
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the treatment group were much happier with the
implementation team as well as the implementation schedule
(Baronas and Louis, 1988) . Because user involvement was
obviously not required to produce a satisfactory product,
the theory of enhancing perceived user control of system
implementation offers an implementation alternative if user
participation in development is either not practical or not
desired. It should be noted, however, that the subjects of
this study were data entry clerks; the same control
perception tactics may not work as effectively on personnel
who depend on information systems as decision making
instruments. Also, germane to the entire subject of
perception control is the ethical question of "disguised
user involvement." In this study, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the culture in which the subject data entry
clerks operated may have been characterized by management
manipulation and any control over the new system
implementation would be a welcomed change. Cultures or
subcultures which are not characterized by manipulative
management practices may be less fertile ground for the
symbolic involvement approach.
d . Ginzberg (1 981
)
Ginzberg (1981) identified generic implementation
issues which consistently reoccur throughout the development
cycle by surveying 35 users of 27 different information
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systems. The survey consisted of one question regarding
level of satisfaction with the system (he used this as a
basis for a statement of system success) and 71 questions
related to the implementation of the system. He found three
issues to be critical to the success of an information
system implementation: commitment to the project (by both
users and managers) , commitment to change (the willingness
of the organization as a whole to accommodate the changes
brought on by the new system) , extent of project definition
and planning (specifying the need for the new system,
identifying project impacts and training requirements, and
defining roles of project team members) (Ginzberg, 1981)
.
Because these three issues first surface in the early stages
of an implementation effort, (Ginzberg, 1981) the study
tends to lend more credence to the user involvement argument
than it does to the perceived control argument.
D. RESISTANCE TO SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
The involvement of employees at various hierarchical
levels during various implementation phases plays a vital
part in the development process by serving to reduce
resistance to the implementation (Edstrom, 1977) . However,
before employees are willing and sible to contribute to an
implementation effort they must understand why the system is
needed and how the new system is going to affect them (Zmud,
1979) . Therefore, education is an important tool for
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reducing user resistance, as well as for mobilizing user
involvement. Employee education may not serve to
sufficiently reduce all sources of resistance, particularly
the political sources (Keen, 1981) and the personnel-
technology interaction sources (Markus, 1983) . Accordingly,
these two sources of resistance are considered in separate
subsections. Also, guidelines for dealing with resistance
in a large-scale public-sector project are presented
(Daniel, 1976)
.
1 . Employee Education
In order for employees to participate effectively in
an implementation effort they must first understand why the
new system is being introduced and how they can expect the
project to affect them (Zmud and Cox, 1979) . Failure to
provide this information eventually leads to resistance to
involvement with the project (Dickson and Powers, 1973)
.
Zmud and Cox (1979) provide an educational framework that
considers six training program areas (overview of the
information system; training in the functional area the
system will serve; technical system training; project
management concepts; system impact on users; procedures for
conversion to the new system) that should be provided to
specific hierarchical positions in the organization (Tcdble
5-1). Training in these areas allows employees to
participate more effectively in the appropriate
72
implementation activities (as presented in Table 5.2)
through their understanding of the need for and the effects
of the new system. To gain maximum benefit from an
education program however, the entire process must go one
step beyond a prograjn of formal education.
The aim of such formal education is to provide a common
ground by which participants will be able to learn from
one another through open exchange of suggestions,
inquiries, and criticisms. Many valuable design and
conversion insights arise only after participants get
beneath the surface relationships among an information
system and the organizational activities being served.
If such a synergistic exchange of knowledge and
experience does not occur, it is unlikely the full
benefits . . . will be realized (Zmud and Cox, 1979)
.
2 . Interactive Resistance
As with any change strategy, the implementation of
an information system may cause resistance (Markus, 1983)
.
Resistance is particularly likely if the system, no matter
how well designed, has characteristics which do not fit the
characteristics of the organization's culture; Markus (1983)
terms this phenomenon "interactive resistance". Markus
(1983) defines three types of resistance factors that may be
encountered during an implementation effort: factors
internal to a group (e.g., a group resists changes that
threaten the group) , factors related to the system itself
(e.g., systems that are not user-friendly or technically
correct may be resisted) , and factors that are a result of
the interaction of the system characteristics internal group
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TABLE 5.2
Educational Requirements for Implementation Participants

















Design T.M O.T.M, F.T O.F
Technical
Design P P T.M T
Develope T T
Conversion C C C
Evaluation
O - overview of information system; F - exposure to functional area;
T - technical (EDP) training; M - project management; P - personal relationship with IS;
C - conversion plan and conversion impact.
factors (e.g., systems that centralize control of data in a
decentralized organization may be resisted) (Markus, 1983)
.
The concept of interactive resistance is in line with the
organizational change maxim of matching the change to fit
the organization's culture. Markus explains:
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New information systems. . .may structure patterns of
interaction that are at odds with the prevailing
culture. In this light, systems can be viewed as a
vehicle for creating organizational change. The greater
the implied change, the greater the resistance.
(Markus, 1983)
Interactive resistance accounts for what Markus (1983)
considers the unlikelihood of successfully introducing
large-scale change only through the introduction of an
information system (see section V. B.). Interactive
resistance can result from either a socio-technical
interaction (the redistribution of tasks that occurs due to
the new system) or political interaction (the redistribution
of power that occurs due to the new system)
.
Markus tested the interactive theory in a case study
involving the implementation of a system that offered
reasons for resistance that could be explained by all the
sources for resistance (internal, system, and interactive)
.
She found that after the internal (personnel) factor was
accounted for (by the introduction of a new manager in the
resisting division, who had originally been one of the
system designers) and the system factors were removed (by
fixing the systems original technical deficiencies) the
political source remained and so did resistance to the
system (Markus, 1983) . It was not until the organization
was formally reorganized and the source of interactive
political resistance removed, that resistance to the system
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was reduced sufficiently to allow the implementation effort
to be termed a success (Markus, 1983)
.
Markus (1983) lists certain tactics that are
effective in dealing with interactive resistance: allow
management to select the personnel who will use the new
system; train and educate users; gain user commitment to the
outcome (by user participation in the design process) ; gain
manager support (they must encourage user compliance with
the new system) ; change the organization to conform to the
new system (Markus, 1983) . Specific methodologies for
implementing these tactics were left unspecified.
The most important implication of the interactive theory
is that the best prescription for an implementation
strategy and for the specific design content of a system
will follow from a thorough diagnosis of the
organizational setting in which the system will be used.
(Markus, 1983)
She further elaborates on the "diagnosis of the
organizational setting" as a social or political analysis of
the organization; what was referred to in Section II as a
cultural analysis.
3 . Polit.ics
Keen (1981) identifies three strategic sources of
resistance: social inertia (the tendency of an organization
to remain at status quo) ; pluralism (the existence of
multiple actors that have conflicting goals, values, and
priorities) ; counter-implementation (the efforts by
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organizational actors to eliminate or reduce the
effectiveness of a given system) . The sources of resistance
identified by Keen not only account for Markus's interactive
resistance (the conflict of tasks or positions brought about
by an information system implementation can be understood as
an aspect of pluralism) but also identify different sources
of resistance which may be directly attributable to a system
implementation (i.e., counter-implementation) or not
directly attributable (i.e., social inertia). He advocates
dealing with all these issues strategically by using
political efforts; "getting commitment, or building support,
or creating momentum for change" (Keen, 1981)
.
Instead of viewing the three sources of resistance
as faults to be suppressed. Keen accepts them as
characteristics of any organization that may actually
benefit the organization in the long run.
Many innovations are dumb ideas. Others threaten the
interests of individuals and groups by intruding on
their territory, limiting their autonomy, reducing their
influence, or adding to their workload. While we all
may try to act in the corporate interest, we often have
very different definitions of exactly what that is
(Keen, 1981)
.
Although no formal strategic political model for managing
change is suggested by Keen, he does advocate the use of the
following outline for action:
1. a senior manager (termed a "fixer" by Keen) must
head the implementation effort and have full
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authority and resources to negotiate with those who
will be affected by the system,
2
.
a steering committee must be actively involved in
any issues related to the control of data,
3. substantial effort should be spent in the predesign
stages to make system objectives operationally
oriented and allow the project to be broken into
clear phases, and
4 systems staff cannot dismiss organizational and
political issues as irrelevant or not their
responsibility, but be able to credibly operate in
the manager' s world.
System implementation is political as well as technical in
nature (Keen, 1981) . , For this reason, the political
processes of getting commitment, building support, and
creating momentum for change are an inevitsible part of an
information system development effort.
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VI . RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO CIM
There is an expectation that CIM will be resisted for
numerous reasons. The first of these reasons is CIM is an
innovation as described in Chapter III. CIM is an
innovation, because it is the first attempt by The Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to standardize and centralize
administrative data processing procedures among the
different agencies within DoD.
Sources of potential resistance as discussed in Chapters
IV and V, should be examined by CIM management because the
potential for these types of resistance exists within the
CIM functional areas. For example, system implementations
will be resisted if the systems are technically
insufficient. Another example of resistance is the
interaction of people and systems. The CIM initiative will
result in an organizational redistribution of power. The
redistribution of power may result in political resistance.
Social inertia may also occur, because people tend to avoid
major strategic changes regardless of the prior planning and
implementation strategies pursued. Pluralism may be evident
despite the authoritarian chain of command within DoD. The
biggest potential for political resistance is
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counterimplementation (in this case end user system
development, which sidesteps the CIM implemented systems).
Since DoD agencies have been developing their own
administrative data processing systems for so long, a pool
of information system expertise exists in all DoD agencies.
This pool may develop alternate systems that meet individual
agency requirements not met by CIM. The agencies will
appear to be using the systems as set up by CIM, however,
they will be using "home grown" systems at a level not
visible to the OSD
.
As discussed in Chapter III organizations that are
formalized and bureaucratic have a higher success rate in
implementing innovative change. Therefore despite any
anticipated resistance, CIM has a higher potential for
success due to the formalized bureaucratic structure of DoD.
The CIM initiative is an innovative change that involves
more than a MIS implementation; it also redefines basic
standards, procedures and agency interactions within DoD.
Therefore, CIM initiative must esteiblish new procedures and
standards prior to implementing a "best of breed" (the
evaluation of existing computer systems within the different
functional areas and choosing the system that best





Considering expected resistance, it is recommended that
CIM take a four phase implementation approach.
1 . Phase One
This phase includes:
a. the creation, establishment and communication of the
vision (the outcome) desired by CIM,
b. the reorganization of the functional areas under OSD
control, and
c. the implementation of "the best of breed" /interim
system.
The establishment of a vision indicates a need for
strong leadership at the highest level within the CIM
organization; and due to the new emerging subcultures strong
leadership will also be required at the functional group
level. Strong effective leadership is vital not only for
the creation of the vision as discussed by Hickman and Silva
(1984) , but also due to the role the leader will play in the
formation of cultural paradigms of the newly emerging
functional area subcultures (Schein, 1985) . The vision must
include more than just project goals and purposes, as
suggested by Pettigrew (197 9) , but also take into account
CIM' s overall objectives.
Being a±>le to effectively communicate the vision to
the agencies within DoD is paramount. The implementation
81
hinges not only on the creation of the vision, but equally
on the ability of CIM to clearly communicate the vision
throughout DoD, thereby reducing resistance (Schein, 1985)
.
Schein (1985) also suggests top management (i.e., admirals
and generals responsible for each functional area) must
understand the purpose and support the vision of CIM.
Without their support CIM faces resistance from the top
echelon which will filter down throughout an entire DoD
agency
.
To further reduce resistance CIM management must
identify a change agent, who is committed to the CIM
initiative, within each functional area for each DoD agency.
This change agent needs to be senior enough to have the
authority to implement policy and procedural changes
throughout their agency. The change agent should also be an
expert in the functional area to which they are assigned.
As discussed by Lawrence (1969) the change agent provides
each agency with a "trusted agent" who shares their concerns
and will ensure that an agency's individual requirements are
considered. Ginzberg (1981) identified three issues that
recur throughout an implementation life cycle: commitment to
the project, organizational commitment to change, and
project definition and planning. A change agent's role is
to ensure that these recurring issues are dealt with
effectively.
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In determining the standard procedures and the "best
of breed" system for each functional area, CIM should
disregard a cultural assessment. Despite the potential
benefits of conducting a cultural assessment prior to any
large-scale organizational change, the size and numerous
subcultures within DoD dictate that an assessment will
require months if not years to complete. If CIM management
were to conduct a large scale cultural assessment, the
social inertia and the political resistance within DoD could
drag out the CIM initiative until the change in governmental
leadership made CIM passe. The formalized structure of DoD
will allow CIM to ignore the culture initially, but an
increased amount of resistance should be anticipated.
(Schwartz and Davis, 1981) . However, the additional
resistance will be reduced by the communication efforts of
the change agent. The change agents role is to keep their
particular DoD agency informed of progress and how the
implementation of the new procedures and the "best of breed"
system relates to the overall vision of the CIM initiative.
2 . Phase Two
This phase starts after the standard procedures and
the "best of breed" are implemented and functional. This
phase is used to determine the different DoD agency' s system
requirements in a culturally familiar environment. It will
ensure that rec[uirements that are neglected due the "best of
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breed" approach are not ignored during the design and
implementation of the final ultimate system for each
functional area. In order for CIM to discriminate between
legitimate needs versus culturally biased desires of each
DoD agency, a cultural assessment of each agencies'
applicable functional area is needed.
The change agents for each agency within their own
functional areas are given the authority to compile that
agency' s system requirements in whatever style is culturally
acceptable to that agency. This will allow for vital user
participation in determining system requirements and
establishes the change agent as the central figure for
change in that agency. It is the responsibility of the
change agent to use the guidelines set down by Lawrence
(1969) . The change agent also needs to communicate to and
educate agency users and personnel so they understand their
roles in the development of the ultimate system (Zmud and
Cox, 197 9) . CIM should publish a format for the submission
of each agency's functional areas requirements list. The
change agent should be given a time limit set by CIM to
accomplish this requirements list (e.g., one year). The
cultural assessment CIM management conducts needs to be done
during the ssime time frame that the change agents are
conducting and determining their requirements list.
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3 . Phase Three
This phase starts when a functional areas'
requirements are determined by the individual change agents
within their own DoD agency and CIM management has completed
the cultural assessment of the different DoD agencies for
that functional area. The purpose of this phase is to have
the different change agents meet together and determine what
the DoD wide requirements are for the ultimate system in
their functional area.
CIM management must supply a chairman who has the
authority to make final policy and requirement decisions as
described by Lawrence (1969) . Keen (1981) further suggests
that this chairman has full authority and resources to
negotiate requirements with the various change agents within
the functional area. This chairman needs to be well
acquainted with the cultural assessments of each agency.
This should allow that individual to determine when change
agents are presenting their requirements as needs when they
are actually culturally biased wants.
The change agents during this phase need to
communicate the results of these proceedings back to their
respective DoD agencies as a check to ensure that all
requirements are fully considered.
This process is culturally compatible in DoD,
because it mimics the Planning, Programming, & Budget System
(PPBS) . The PPBS is a process wherein the individual
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agencies determine their needs. These needs are then passed
to the OSD level where they are scrutinized and final
decisions are made on what will be submitted in a particular
funding request
.
4 . Phase Four
The purpose of this phase is to implement the
ultimate system in the various agencies. This assumes that
the system has been built using standard software and
hardware production techniques. The resistance to the
implementation of the ultimate system in this phase should
be less than the resistance experienced in phase one,
because of the cultural assessments, as suggested by
Schwartz and Davis (1981) , and considerations of the
individual DoD agencies' requirements carried out in phases
two and three.
The role of the change agent continues to be vital
during this phase as suggested by Lawrence (1969) . As part
of their role the change agents must give users as much
latitude as possible in determining and controlling the
implementation schedule as discussed by Baronas and Louis
(1988) . This user participation will ensure maximum
acceptability and use of the new ultimate system.
During the implementation of the ultimate system it
must be determined to whom functional area system
supervisors will report. If their immediate supervisor is
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within their respective agency, the potential for
counterimplementation is increased. If their immediate
supervisor is within a unified higher authority (such as
OSD) then the potential for conflict, due to the occurrence
of unanticipated future requirements, exists between an
agency and CIM. The advantages and disadvantages of
centralized versus decentralized command structure must be
considered by CIM and is an appropriate area for further
research.
Resistance to the CIM initiative is highly likely
and some of this resistance will be due to the cultural
characteristics of the various DoD agencies. The literature
indicates that any organizational change, including an
information systems implementation, will have the greatest
level of success if consideration for an organization's
cultural characteristics is integrated into the
implementation plan. For CIM to maximize the effectiveness
and efficiency of DoD information systems, the various
subcultures of DoD agencies must be understood, and this
understanding must be applied to any implementation plan.
By following the sUDOve recommendations for an implementation




The CIM initiative in DoD is intended to counter
insufficiencies in DoD ADP acquisition and management
procedures as presented in the DMR. CIM' s purpose is to
eliminate redundancy, implement management efficiencies, and
develop common data requirements for similar functions
throughout DoD.
A CIM office was established on October 17, 1989 under
the DoD Deputy Comptroller for Information Resource
Management (DC(IRM)) . Subsequently, CIM was moved from IRM
to Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
effectively broadening CIM' s scope to include all DoD
administrative information systems. Under this new
arrangement, the head of CIM reports directly to the
Secretary of Defense or his deputy.
Implementation of CIM was accomplished through the
establishment of two groups, divided by the aspects of the
CIM implementation strategy each would coordinate. The
Executive Level Group (ELG) was charged with developing an
overall information strategy for DoD. The group consists of
nine members with diverse information system management
backgrounds; some from the civilian sector, others from DoD.
To execute the overall strategy, eight (as of January 31,
1991) functional work groups oversee the work within their
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respective functional area (eg. civilian payroll, civilian
personnel, contract payment, financial operations,
government furnished material, material management, medical,
and warehousing) . The functional work groups are manned by
senior information system personnel from each service and
DoD agency whose task is to standardize all information
processing systems in a given functional area across all DoD
agencies. The expectation is that CIM will eventually
produce a standardized system for every administrative
functional area in DoD, across agency and service
boundaries
.
The methodology of a functional area work group is to
establish a single requirements design for its area of
responsibility. This is accomplished through a phased
approach. Phase 1 is the production of a functional area
vision, including statements of mission, scope, policy, and
guiding principles for the next ten year period. The
emphasis is on establishing a unified and standardized
strategy and information system that will apply equally well
to all DOD agencies. Phase 2 is a functional business plan
(including requirements, actions, and milestones) for
implementing the information systems that will support the
Phase 1 vision. Phase 3 assesses the contribution of
information systems currently in use toward the
accomplishment of the Phase 1 vision. This will support the
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transition from the current information systems to the
standardized systems envisioned in Phase 1.
The reduction in redundant systems which CIM will bring
about is expected to produce a major cost savings for DoD.
The annual DoD ADP budget of $9 billion was targeted for
reduction by DoD, in order to fund CIM. A total of $3.5
billion worth of cuts were planned for the DoD ADP budget
through 1995; CIM was funded for $1 billion through 1995.
Savings were predicted to come from the DoD's diversion of
funds, originally intended for development of new systems
and upgrade of old systems, to conversion of existing
systems to the CIM initiative. These CIM systems were
expected to further increase savings by reducing operations
and maintenance costs.
CIM faces several areas of difficulty as it attempts to
standardize information system operations that have long
operated independently. These problems include (but may not
be limited to)
:
1. parochialism/turf fighting - long standing
interservice rivalries and pride of ownership must
be put aside by all agencies in order to work toward
a long range vision,
2
.
external influences - functional group members
operate in a highly political environment; service
influence will be difficult to ignore since all
members expect to eventually return to their own service,
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3. leadership - due to the often limited tenure of
military officers and political appointees, coherent
leadership may present a problem,
4
.
interim strategies - while the ultimate vision
system is being developed, interim systems must be
implemented; while an initial decision to
provisionally implement the "best of breed" in each
functional area (that system deemed best by the
functional group) has been made, this decision could
lead to degraded operational capabilities for
services not familiar with the chosen system.
All information within this appendix was compiled from






1. Identity. Every organization must have a stated
purpose for its existence. The purpose that an organization
uses to justify its existence may aim at a ultimate goal, or
be an ongoing function that the organization performs into
perpetuity
.
2. Environment. An organization's culture should
have a concept of the environmental situation in which it
will have to operate. The environment consists of the
external forces (resources, superiors, allies, adversaries)
that have an impact on the organization.
3. Operations. The culture must define the process
by which the organization accomplishes its aims. This
includes an understanding of the individual tasks required
for the organization to operate, and the structural
configuration of its work units.
4. MexDbership. Culture also guides the selection of
an organization's members. Each organization must decide
what type of background entering members require, and the
amount of indoctrination needed once members are accepted to
the organization.
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5. Criteria. Finally, an organization's culture
must define the operational criteria for success or failure
Every organization must have some measures of its
performance (revenue, customers served, election wins) in
accomplishing the organization's goals.
(Engineer Studies Center, 1987)
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APPENDIX C
Forces in Unfreezing, Moving, and Refreezing as presented by







Top and unit managers felt the problem was important
to company.
2. Top managers became involved.
3. Unit managers recognized a need for change.
4. Top managers initiated the study.
5. Top and unit managers were open, candid.
6. Unit managers revised some of their assumptions.
Unfavorable :
1 Unit managers could not state their problems
clearly.
2. Top managers felt the problem was too big.
3. Unit managers did not recognize the need for change.
4. Unit managers felt threatened by the project.
5. Unit managers resented the study.
6. Unit managers lacked confidence in the management
scientists.




1. Unit managers and management scientists gathered
data jointly.
2. Relevant data were accessible, available.
3. New alternatives were devised.
4. Unit managers reviewed and evaluated alternatives.
5. Top managers were advised of options.
6. Top managers helped develop a solution.





Management scientists could not educate the unit
managers
.
2. Needed data were not made available.
3. Unit managers did not help develop a solution.
4 Unit managers did not understand the solution of the
management scientists.





1. Unit managers tried the solution.
2. Utilization showed the superiority of the new
solution.
3. Management scientists initiated positive feedback
after the early use
4. Solution was widely accepted after initial success.
5. Unit managers were satisfied.
6. Solution was used in other areas.




Management scientists did not try to support new
managerial behavior after the solution was used.
2. Management scientists did not try to reestablish
stability after the solution was used.
3. Results were difficult to measure.
4. Standards for evaluating results were lacking.
5. Top management ignored the solution recommended by
the management scientists.
6. Solution incompatible with the needs and resources
of the unit.
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